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Why do states abandon their wartime coalition partners? Existing research focuses on domestic politics, intra-coalition challenges, and battlefield circumstances to explain defection. I argue that states unsatisfied with their current levels of security and political embeddedness with a coalition leader will not defect from ongoing coalition operations. A state’s sustained engagement in coalition operations serves as a costly signal of reliability and commitment as well as a desire for improved relations with the coalition leader that is not yet realized despite greater alignment of its security interests with the coalition leader. Using newly compiled data on cases of defection from the US-led coalition in Iraq from 2003 to 2009, I demonstrate that states are less likely to defect in the face of growing costs and domestic pressures when their potential for an alliance with the United States is not fulfilled. This research contributes to the literature by bringing together two lines of research on coalitions and alliances and has important policy implications.