Lying Politicians: Conspiracy Theory, In-Party Sanctions, and Candidate Appeal

• In Event: External Influences on Candidate Evaluations

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the role of political misinformation and in-party sanctions in evaluations of candidate appeal. Previous research has examined how individuals engage with misleading information in national politics, but we know little about how these dynamics operate at other levels of politics. Using a survey experiment with 1,000 participants, we find that respondents generally have a negative opinion of candidates who spread misinformation. We also find that in-party interventions may increase a willingness to sanction wrongdoers in some cases. When we break down the results by party identification, we find significant differences between Democrats and Republicans in their willingness to punish in-party candidates who spread misinformation. Democrats are significantly more willing to police these candidates across all conditions, while Republicans are less willing to do so. This finding, which we term "polarized policing," has important implications for the health of democracy and the study of political elite deviance.

Author

• Drew Cagle, College of Coastal Georgia