Who Spreads Fake News and Why?

• In Event: Facts, Fake News, and Resistance to the Truth

Abstract

We develop a game theoretic model in which the world is inhabited by two types of agents: smart (she) and gullible (he). Agents are aligned in a queue and receive a message. Every agent is assumed to have a different prior about the truthfulness of the message. Upon receiving the message, each agent must decide whether to forward it as is, filter it (forward only if it is verified) or kill it (stop it from propagating). We assume that a smart agent has a lower cost of verifying the truthfulness of the message but may face a loss in reputation if she propagates false information or fake news. In this context, we determine a) who is more likely to propagate fake news b) when are fake news likely to spread more, i.e., ‘go viral’. Finally, we investigate the welfare considerations under each scenario.

Authors

• Abhra Roy, Kennesaw State University

• Tridib Bandyopadhyay, Kennesaw State University