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Scholars assume that legislators behave the way they do to reap electoral rewards. Despite people overwhelmingly expressing the desire for compromise, gridlock persists. Yet few studies have examined what rewards obstructive behavior yields and under what circumstances. Moreover, the existing literature fails to examine voters’ preferences and individual differences between voters. The studies that do generally use white male legislators in their treatments unless they are specifically studying gender and race. Therefore, much of the existing research on Congress centers on the study of how voters react to white male legislators and fails to consider how the electoral rewards for a legislator’s behavior may be contingent upon gender and race. This study examines the circumstances in which a citizen will support legislative gridlock over productivity, and posits that a legislator’s gender and race are key moderating variables in this relationship. To test our theory, we conduct a novel conjoint experiment to examine how citizens’ punishment of gridlock depends on the obstructing legislators’ identities. By varying both the race and gender of hypothetical politicians, we hope to elucidate how supportive citizens are of legislators who create gridlock and, crucially, whether gender and race condition this support. Ultimately, we argue that gridlock may persist without significant democratic accountability because men – particularly white men – receive more leeway for obstruction from voters, while women – particularly white and Asian women – face greater punishment for similar behavior.