High Stakes Negotiation: Reaching Agreement on Pandemic Aid in 2020

• In Event: Understanding Legislative Negotiation

Abstract

In the midst of divided government, a House and Senate controlled by different parties, and a presidential election year, the U.S. enacted the most robust economic response to the COVID-19 pandemic of any advanced democracy. Contrary to its reputation for gridlock and inaction, Congress enacted these measures quickly and on a wholly bipartisan basis. In this paper, we apply concepts from the literature on negotiation to better understand how policymakers “got to yes” on 2020’s two largest COVID aid packages. The concept of the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) affords a systematic way to think through the fundamental choice each side weighs in negotiations. “All party mapping” is a critical skill for coalition leaders, as they anticipate the players who need to be included. We also show that the Covid-aid negotiations were shaped by anchoring, sequencing, and repeated interaction. We discuss how these concepts help advance congressional studies beyond simple theoretical models that assume a fixed bargaining space and a single dimension.

Authors

• Frances E. Lee, Princeton University

• Bettina Poirier, American University

• Christopher P Bertram, Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies