Turning a Blind Eye: Nuclear Counterproliferation and the International Audience

• In Event: Nuclear Proliferation and Counterproliferation

Abstract

When do states respond swiftly to nuclear counterproliferation and when do they not? In contrast to diplomatic and economic tools to prevent nuclear proliferation, fewer countries have openly admitted to using counterproliferation tools. However, when they do, the global response is largely limited to verbal condemnation despite the reoccurring violations of international law. The article develops insights into this seemingly reluctant response by third-party states to nuclear counterproliferation attacks (C=~40). Employing process tracing in a most-similar exploratory case design, I consult a variety of rich archival resources including official documents to analyze three cases in depth: Operation Opera, 1980s Iraqi attacks on Iran, and assassinations of Iranian scientists. This work will advance an understanding of international behavior in response to selected military actions. It provides a framework of strategic reasoning for preventive counterproliferation strikes.

Author

• Doreen Horschig, Center for Strategic and International Studies