Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Lethal Debut of Atomic Weaponry

• In Event: Nuclear Politics in an Age of Mis- and Disinformation

Abstract

Why do states sometimes disclose new military capabilities to their enemies in exceptionally deadly ways, even when tamer alternatives seem feasible? Existing scholarship examines why states reveal or conceal secret military assets but offers limited insights on how new capabilities are unveiled. Our theory of lethal capability disclosures foregrounds the political rewards of dramatizing the impact of new capabilities. When a new asset’s ability to kill and destroy is perceived to be “revolutionary,” states look for opportunities to showcase its full potential through lethal means. They pay close attention to the scenography of the disclosure event, ensuring that the new asset’s harmful effects on human life and the surrounding environment is “staged” in the most graphic terms possible. This is especially valuable when states anticipate a long-term leverage deficit vis-à-vis their major adversaries in terms of traditionally recognized capabilities. We illustrate this theory by examining American deliberations on the proposal to conduct a noncombat demonstration of the atomic bomb vis-à-vis Japan during World War II. Concerns about finding a proper background to put the bomb’s strength “on display” for the Soviet Union led U.S. policymakers to reject this alternative in favor using the bomb to incinerate cities and civilians.

Authors

• Joshua Byun, Boston College

• Austin Carson, University of Chicago