The Influence of Oligarchs and Regional Political Machines on Georgian Elections

• In Event: Voting Behavior and Legislatures: Insights and Implications

Abstract

Post-Soviet privatization and democratization led to the emergence of giant corporate conglomerates (often run by oligarchs) with a pronounced interest in economic and political matters. The post-communist transition also witnessed the emergence of regional political machines with strong ties to regional executive offices. With access to politicians, administrative resources, and considerable assets, oligarchic and regional political machines greatly influence the electoral process, either by acting as a party substitute or by supporting existing formations. Using an original dataset for Georgian oligarchic networks, regional political machines, and municipal elections in 63 municipalities and 10 districts of Tbilisi, I employ a multilevel mixed-effects model to identify the effect of oligarchic networks and regional political machines on regional elections between 2010-2021. I argue that the support of oligarchic networks and regional political machines increases the percentage of votes received by the party at the municipal/district level. I also posit that asset ownership in a municipality/district by either an oligarchic network or a regional political machine increased the percentage of votes received by the party at the municipal/district level. My analysis clearly shows that oligarchic networks and regional political machines significantly influence political parties' performance. The empirical model also demonstrates that asset ownership at the municipal/district level increases the number of votes received by a party.

Author

• Zaur Kapanadze, Texas Tech University