Patronage or Competence? Ministerial Appointment in Africa

• In Event: Elite-Citizen Relations

Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that top leaders in Africa strategically allocate cabinet appointments to ethnic patrons to form a broad ruling coalition. However, this account cannot explain the rise of technocrats in African governments, especially those who lack political resources to mobilize voters. In this paper, I examine under which conditions leaders prioritize competence over patronage in Africa. Specifically, I propose a theory of political appointment taking into account the interplay of competence and patronage concerns. I then test whether democratic institutions encourage competence-based appointment, drawing upon an original data set on minister's education, prior occupation and employer in 15 countries from their independence through 2004. By shedding light on the determinants of ministerial appointment beyond ethnicity, this study contributes to the burgeoning literature of political selection and recruitment in Africa and improves our understanding of how institutions differently incentivize top leaders' political recruitment.

Author

• Dongil Lee, KDI School of Public Policy and Management