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In this chapter from our forthcoming book, Public Support for the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press), we examine how partisanship might threaten the rule of law as a democratic guardrail. We focus on the basic procedural ability of citizens to challenge governmental actions of dubious authority: the legal process. The rule of law is imperiled if citizens only accept judicial wins for their “team” and losses for their opponents. Were it the case that the partisanship of those bringing a challenge alleging a violation of the rule of law shades citizens' responses to the outcome of the challenge, then the ability of political minorities to hold majorities into account is endangered.
Leveraging the practice of abstract judicial review in Germany, Hungary, and Poland, we examine the results of a survey experiment fielded on a nationally-representative sample in each country. We randomize the identity of the political party bringing a challenge to a constitutionally dubious vaccine policy, with the expectation that respondents may be less supportive of a court decision that rules in favor of a party they openly oppose. We expect that such a partisan effect will be tempered by one's support for the rule of law, but moreso in the consolidated democracy of Germany than in Poland and Hungary. We conclude with a discussion on the extent to which support for the rule of law can be resistant to the pernicious effects of partisanship and the conditions under which it is most likely to do so.