Polarization and Support for Undemocratic Behavior: The Case of Russia

• In Event: Ideology in Authoritarian Regimes: Citizen and Elite Perspectives

Abstract

When do autocrats pay an electoral cost for subverting democracy? Research in democracies—and some authoritarian contexts—suggests that partisan attachments can lead voters to look past the undemocratic behavior of their copartisan leaders in polarized societies. Although ideological and partisan attachments are quite weak in contemporary electoral autocracies, supporters of such regimes often have a strong emotional aversion toward the opposition, who are portrayed by the regime as traitors or fifth columns. We hypothesize that regime supporters who hold such attitudes will be less likely to punish regime candidates who engage in undemocratic behavior. We examine this claim using a vignette experiment on a face-to-face survey in Russia conducted just before the 2021 State Duma elections. Results suggest that voters generally do punish ruling party candidates for undemocratic behavior, but that antipathy toward the regime’s staunchest opposition—Alexei Navalny and his organization—makes regime supporters (even those who profess to reject strongman rule and favor democracy) less likely to punish regime candidates who attempt to exclude Navalny’s movement from the political process. Affective polarization may thus help to explain how autocrats survive the periodic rise of challengers that occurs in all electoral authoritarian systems—and why they sometimes do not.

Authors

• David Szakonyi, George Washington University

• Yunus E Orhan, Denison University

• Ora John Reuter, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

• Bryn Rosenfeld, Cornell University