Do Voters Reward Eurosceptic Governments?

• In Event: Poster Session: Aid and International Organizations in IPE & Contemporary Issues in Political Science Education
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Aid and International Organizations in IPE

Abstract

Ample literature studies bargaining in the Council of the European Union (EU), and how it is driven by electoral politics and responsiveness to voters’ preferences. Much less attention was given to studying the reverse causal link, i.e. whether voters respond to their country’s share in the benefits of European integration. The lack of theory about how voters respond to the record of Eurosceptic governments in office is an important gap in our understanding of the dynamics of Eurosceptic politics. If Eurosceptic parties cannot systematically use government positions to increase their power, they will struggle to succeed in institutionalizing European integration as the dominant domestic issue-alignment, and the Eurosceptic movement would remain marginal to the process of European integration. We argue that progress in European integration and aggregate-national benefits from it increase voters’ support for mainstream government parties, but decrease voters’ support for Eurosceptic government parties, especially voters with Eurosceptic views. Voters with pro-EU attitudes appreciate both greater European integration and the gains from it, while for voters with Eurosceptic attitudes such gains conflict with their desire to frustrate European integration. Voters will not reward Eurosceptic government parties for the benefits of integration if they are deemed as a signal that the government has compromised over its Eurosceptic agenda. We test our arguments using linear regression analysis, multiple imputations, and conjoint survey experimental design. Based on data on all parties and national elections in all of the EU member states from 1979 to 2018, we find that voters reward mainstream government parties that increase net fiscal funding from the EU (their votes increase by 11 percent for an increase in net transfers worth one percent of GDP) but punish Eurosceptic incumbent parties (votes falls by 29 percent). High-profile EU-events hurt mainstream government parties (losing 18 percent of the votes for a rise of one percent in the events index), but especially Eurosceptic incumbent parties (perhaps losing twice as much). Large Eurosceptic incumbent parties in particular lose 24 percent of their votes when the de jure integration index (EU treaties and legislation) rises by one percent. Though further studies are warranted to cement stronger assertions, these initial results document how difficult it is for Eurosceptic parties to sustain power.

Authors

• Gal Bitton, Harvard University

• Tal Sadeh, Tel Aviv University