The Social Foundations of Democratic Norms

• In Event: Explaining Citizen Support for Democratic Norms and Values

Abstract

Democratic backsliding across consolidated democracies has led scholars to decry the harm to democratic norms. However, democratic norms remain largely under-theorized phenomena. This conceptual gap holds implications for one of the primary drivers of backsliding: voters who prioritize supporting co-partisan politicians over candidates who are willing to protect democratic institutions. Do democratic norms hold the capacity to shift this calculus back in favor of democracy? The study addresses this question through two contributions. First, I provide a precise definition of democratic norms as they operate among citizens by considering their `descriptive’ and `injunctive’ components. I then consider a game theoretic model to demonstrate how norms may pressure citizens, including those who hold a weak commitment to democracy, to overcome partisanship and support politicians who protect democracy. Second, the study details a survey experiment that elicits and shifts descriptive and injunctive democratic norms. Next, I test the implications of the theoretical model in the context of a candidate-choice conjoint experiment. Finally, an augmented dictator game finds behavioral evidence that survey-respondents are willing to sanction those individuals who violate democratic norms. Overall, the study elucidates the mechanisms by which democratic norms operate and underscores their importance for the long-term stability of democracy.

Author

• Daniel A N Goldstein, University of Oslo