Do Direct Elections Improve Representation? Evidence from India

• In Event: The Political Economy of the Developing World

Abstract

Scholars have long debated the merits of direct versus indirect elections. Whereas direct elections are thought to improve representation and enhance redistribution, indirect elections are thought to be elite-dominated and therefore do the reverse. However, few scholars have used modern research designs to provide credible estimates of the causal impact of direct elections on representation and policy outcomes. This is at least partly because electoral systems rarely change, and when they do, they change due to endogenous political processes. This paper addresses this gap by leveraging a spatial and temporal variation in exposure to the direct elections in village council’s of Maharashtra due to a pre-determined election schedule, as direct elections for village heads were introduced in 2017 and withdrawn in 2020. Direct elections for government heads might improve representation as they allow non-elite outsiders to win office and redistribute. They might do the reverse, as elections might become more expensive and therefore lead to the selection of less-representative elites that might wish to redistribute less. Preliminary results suggest that direct elections cause total employment provided under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), the world’s largest social welfare program, to increase by 22%. We are turning next to exploring mechanisms, and to examining the effects of these elections on the descriptive representation of minorities and women.

Authors

• Rikhil R Bhavnani, University of Wisconsin, Madison

• Priyadarshi Amar, University Carlos III (Madrid)

• Amit Suresh Jadhav, University of Wisconsin-Madison