Pilot or Persuasion? The Politics of Reform Dynamics in Authoritarianism

• In Event: Power Politics in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Policy experimentation is an information eliciting mechanism. However, it may also be strategically used by the incumbent to gain political leverage. We propose a theoretical framework in which the initiation and scale of the reform is shaped by the dynamic interaction between the incumbent and an internal rival. Whether the reform is stagnant, pursed through experimentation, or implemented in a big-bang fashion depends on the prior of a successful reform, the status quo payoff, and the political stake of agenda setting power. The model predicts that experimentation is most likely to be pursued when the political stake and the status quo payoff are located within some intermediate ranges. Moreover, the incumbent gained politically through policy experimentations that are implemented at a larger scale. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of this theory through comparative case studies as well as an econometric investigation on the diffusion of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in China.

Authors

• Tianyang Xi, Peking University

• Shuo Chen

• Zhaotian Luo, University of Chicago