Moral Hazard at Sea? Support from Great Powers and Onset of Maritime Disputes

• In Event: Great (and Small) Power Politics

Abstract

Will the support signaled by the great powers on dyads that may have maritime disputes embolden or constrain them in making maritime onset? We know a lot about the role of the alliance in conflict processes concerning territorial issues, whether it is related to “extended deterrence” where dyads are less likely to experience conflict due to alliance or “moral hazard” where they are emboldened to take risky actions. However, we do not know much about the role of great powers in the maritime dispute onset. This paper argues that due to the unique feature of maritime disputes, such as initial claimants being favored by customary international law, difficulties in defending the disputed maritime areas, and the non-existential threat nature of such disputes, the dyads are more likely to witness maritime onset with great powers behind. That is, we are likely to witness the moral hazard effect rather than the extended deterrence effect. Furthermore, the emboldening effect of the alliance is more obvious when the disparity of support signaled by antagonistic powers increases. Defining great powers as the five permanent members in the United Nations Security Council, this paper firstly tests whether overall support signaled by the great powers makes a dyad more likely to have maritime disputes onset. Then, by treating the United States and Russia as antagonistic great powers, this paper tests whether the disparity of support of antagonistic powers makes dyads more likely to have maritime dispute onset. An analysis of maritime disputes onset from 1950 to 2007 with the Issue of Correlates of War (ICOW) supports both hypotheses. The implication of these findings is that scholars and policymakers need to pay special attention to the role played by major powers, especially antagonistic powers, in affecting the management of maritime disputes. Dyads may take assertive claims when knowing third parties are behind them, which is especially true if there is a disparity of support from antagonistic major powers. This paper fills an important gap in the deterrence literature and maritime disputes. It also contributes to our understanding of maritime dispute onset and management of such disputes.

Author

• Weidong Zhang, University of Texas at El Paso