Politics That Makes Sense: The Cognitive Bases of Populism

• In Event: Parties, Populism, and Politics

Abstract

Right-wing populism (RWP) is often defined as a ‘thin’ ideology that focuses on the conflict between a corrupt elite that thwarts the right of the good people to govern themselves. The rise of populism is often explained as a passing response to temporary circumstances such as economic recession or increased immigration.

Here we offer a different view of RWP and a more psychological account of its attraction. We suggest that RWP has an orienting logic that generates a broad and coherent view of politics. In this vein, we suggest that beyond its attention to the conflict between the people and the elite, populism constitutes an essentially anti-liberal democratic vision, one that offers an authoritarian and hierarchical view of governance, an intolerance of political opposition and debate, a dualistic morality, a homogenizing view of in-groups and an ethnocentric, racist view of out-groups.

We also offer a different explanation of the attractiveness of the RWP vision. In our view, the logic of RWP generates a relatively simple, concrete view of politics (both its dynamics and its guiding values) particularly as compared to the relatively complex and abstract understandings of liberal democracy. Therefore, while acknowledging that economic dissatisfaction and cultural anxiety help explain surges in populist sentiment, we suggest that current developments reflect a more enduring and fundamental problem, the inability of most citizens to meet the cognitive (and related emotional) demands of citizenship in contemporary, multicultural democracies. They are asked to live in an ever-changing, increasingly diverse country where moral judgment is more relative and governance involves coordinating a complex system according to abstract principles of freedom and equality. Most citizens cannot make sense of this complexity. The result is confusion, anxiety, and alienation. Populism offers an alternative, less demanding view of politics and society, one that is more readily understood and more emotionally satisfying.

In our empirical research, we explore two hypotheses. First, that populism constitutes a coherent vision of politics that includes five dimensions: (1) an anti-democratic view of governance, (2) a Manichean or dualistic political morality, (3) a view that the nation is best served by a homogeneous population, (4) out-groups are a threat, (5) the cultural and economic elite are not properly part of the nation and do not serve it. Second, that there is a negative relationship between cognitive capacity and political orientation. We hypothesize that the less cognitively able individuals are, the more likely they will be to adopt the more simplistic, right-wing populist view of governance and society.

To examine our claims, we conducted an online survey of 1420 adults using Amazon Turk. To compensate for the liberal bias of a Turk population, we solicited an additional 300 people who were self-described conservatives. The survey included several questions designed to measure each of the five dimensions of populist belief. The survey also included items to assess the cognitive sophistication of the participants. These included the ICAR, the International Cognitive Ability Resource developed by Cambridge and Northwestern Universities and an interactive problem-solving task used to assess level of cognitive development.

Preliminary results are very strong and clear. With regard to our first hypothesis concerning the nature of populism, a correlational analysis of responses to the items used to measure each of the five dimensions of populism indicate that they were strongly correlated with one another, almost always above the .45 level. Factor analysis showed that each dimension constituted a single factor and that various dimensions themselves cohered as elements of populism overall.

Regarding our second hypothesis concerning the cognitive bases of populism, a correlational analysis of the data indicates that RWP is significantly more likely to be embraced by people who think in simple linear and categorical ways. This was true for populism overall and its five dimensions. This was evident whether cognitive capacity was measured using ICAR or the interactive task. Regression analyses indicate that the relationship between cognitive ability and populism remains significant in the context of other variables including age, gender, ideology, and years of education.

In sum, our hypotheses regarding (1) the structured, coherent nature of populist beliefs and (2) the negative relationship between populism and cognitive ability were both strongly supported by the data. We conclude by discussing the broader practical political implications of our findings.

Authors

• Shawn W. Rosenberg

• Brent Lamont Clark, University of California, Irvine