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In severely divided societies, power sharing, of the consociational or centripetal variety, is a frequently recommended method for reducing ethnic conflict and producing a measure of interethnic accommodation. Yet power sharing has a decidedly mixed record. In some countries, it has certainly reduced the incidence of violent conflict. In others, however, power sharing has been difficult to adopt and, when adopted, has not necessarily proved durable. This paper will survey the obstacles to adoption and to durability. It will explain the adoption problem, describe some instances of adoptions gone wrong and of reneging on plans that were adopted. In the course of this elucidation, the paper will also enumerate the obstacles to achieving ambitious goals of interethnic accommodation in cases in which power sharing did not initially encounter adoption problems. The paper will conclude by proposing an alternative to power sharing for countries that experience serious ethnic conflict.