Oligarch Networks & Legislatures in Developing Democracies: The Case of Ukraine

• In Event: Voting Behavior and Legislatures: Insights and Implications

Abstract

Legislative state capture by wealthy elites is a widespread phenomenon in developing democracies, yet the mechanisms through which it works and the impact it has on political and policy outcomes remain poorly understood. I argue that, to successfully defend their wealth in the context of a competitive political environment and weak rule of law, oligarchs promote as members of parliament individuals who are linked to them via interpersonal ties, specifically, kinship ties and connections based on common affiliation with businesses, non-profits, and political party organizations. Through their networks of loyal legislators, oligarchs ensure the adoption of policies favorable to their economic interests and shape policymaking, including key reform processes. To develop and test these arguments, I employ descriptive and inferential social network and regression analyses of original quantitative data on nearly 1,000 legislators and oligarchs, and interview-based evidence on the case of Ukraine after the Euromaidan (2014-2022). The study has important implications for the literatures on political connections, neopatrimonialism, legislatures, political parties, democracy and representation, and the politics of reform.

Author

• Silviya Nitsova, The University of Manchester