Term Limit Evasion and Power Sharing

• In Event: Comparative Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Under what conditions can leaders successfully remove constitutional term limits? I argue that term limit evasion can actually stabilize existing power sharing arrangements, especially when the ruling party is weak or non-existent. When a single incumbent, rather than a long-lived ruling party, manages the power sharing arrangement, elites fear leadership change as it may upend their current status. In such cases, elites tolerate and even support the removal of term limits. By contrast, when a strong ruling party manages leadership succession and ensures the continuity of power sharing agreements, elites are less likely to tolerate term limit evasion because their status does not depend on one particular leader. I test this theory using original data on a global set of countries from 1990-2020 that includes whether an attempt to evade term limits was made, the strategies that were used, and whether the attempt was successful or not.

Author

• Anne Meng, University of Virginia