Public Trust in State Coercive Institutions That Provide Election Security

• In Event: Public Trust in Elections: Causes and Consequences from a Global Perspective

Abstract

State security forces play a pivotal role during elections in unconsolidated democracies, carrying the main responsibility for maintaining security before, during, and after election day. Yet, they are also partisan enforcers, acting on behalf of the incumbent regime to increase its electoral fortune. This presents a paradox: the state’s coercive agents that are best place to protect citizens from electoral intimidation might be their biggest source of threat. In spite of this, research that unpacks this ambiguous role is scarce. We explore
how coercive behavior of security forces during elections shapes citizens’ attitudes towards this actor, and argue that this depends on citizens’ relationship to the state. While we expect individuals belonging to marginalized groups to punish coercive security force
behaviour with trust withdrawal, we expect those who do not belong to marginalized groups to reward security forces with a trust addition. To test this expectation, we draw on a nationally representative survey conducted after the 2019 general elections in Nigeria,
combined with geo-referenced event data on the behaviour of state security. We find that marginalized individuals decrease trust levels in the presence of security force coercion but that security force coercion has no effect on trust levels for individuals that are not marginalized.

Authors

• Annekatrin Deglow, Uppsala University

• Hanne Fjelde, Uppsala University

• Nicholas Kerr, University of Florida