The Loyalty of al-Qaida’s Affiliates during the Islamic State Challenge

• In Event: Cooperation and Competition among Militant Groups

Abstract

Why did the alliances between al-Qaeda and its affiliates persist despite the efforts of the Islamic State to encourage defections? From a narrow rational, cost-benefit calculus, one would have expected al-Qaida’s affiliates to defect to the Islamic State during the 2014-2015 timeframe, given that it offered an alternative partner option with more cachet, funding, recruitment appeal, and territory. But ultimately, none of al-Qaida’s affiliate partners defected to the Islamic State. We argue that the resilience of al-Qaida’s affiliate relationships was based primarily on alliance embeddedness, path dependency, and intra-affiliate relations. We find that the affiliate groups’ decisions were influenced by the social networks in which the affiliates operated as well as some elements of path dependency established at the outset of the alliances. Al-Qaida developed social processes and institutions, dynamics that al-Qaeda’s affiliates then replicated over the course of their alliances with al-Qaida. In addition, the alliances became further embedded through relations among the affiliates. Consequently, the Islamic States’ material advantages were insufficient to cause al-Qaeda’s affiliates to defect. Though these affiliate relationships differ in some respects from other militant group alliances, the loyalty of al-Qaida’s affiliates in the face of a preferable alternative sheds light on the factors that underpin alliance sustainment.

Authors

• Sara Harmouch

• Tricia Bacon, American University