Are IOs Democratic? The Politics of Preference Aggregation in Global Governance

• In Event: Political Economy of Climate Change

Abstract

International organizations (IOs) are tasked with aggregating their principals' preferences to achieve cooperative outcomes. How do IOs accomplish this, and which states' preferences most impact the shape of IOs' policies? We argue that institutional design features can influence which states are best able to advance their preferences in the policymaking process. We offer evidence from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which surveils and reforms its members' economies in exchange for financial assistance. Focusing on issues related to climate change, we leverage text-as-data tools to show that the IMF's policy output best reflects the preferences of members that communicate consistent, intense preferences at Executive Board meetings. A given state’s ability to do so is a product of whether they represent themselves on the Board or a part of a constituency. Because large, wealthy states represent themselves, while smaller, poorer states are part of constituencies, this institutional design feature results in structural disadvantages for the Global South in representing its preferences in IMF policymaking on climate issues. These findings advance our understanding of preference aggregation through IOs and offer a microfoundational account of how democratic deficits materialize in multilateralism.

Authors

• Sabrina Beth Arias, Lehigh University

• Richard Clark, University of Notre Dame

• Ayse Kaya, Swarthmore College