State Institutions and Populist Authoritarian Failure in India

• In Event: Authoritarian Consolidation and State Institutions

Abstract

Much of the academic debate on populist politics has focused on its deleterious impact on democracy. Populists bend norms, polarize the electorate, and encourage attacks on the establishment and minorities alike, in the name of “the people.” Some commentators (e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018) have argued that autogolpes by populists in office represent the new face of authoritarianism. Less recognized is the variation in the success and failure of populist leaders to undermine democracy; some populists, once in power, work to dismantle democratic institutions and undermine competition, while others are forced from power through elections, or by the intervention of other forces. What explains the factors that lead some populists to consolidate authoritarian power, while others are prevented? India represents an ideal case for such an analysis: a consolidated and vibrant democracy since independence, it has experienced two authoritarian periods (one historical, one on-going) that began as populist revolts against the political establishment in the electoral arena. In the 1970s, Indira Gandhi’s left-populist mobilization and landslide elections following the fracturing of Congress descended into mass contentious politics and the authoritarian Emergency, which lasted 20 months before new elections brought a non-Congress government to power. Narendra Modi came to power, as the head of the BJP, at the head of a populist electoral mobilization against the establishment; over the last eight years, he and his party have consolidated de facto (competitive) authoritarian rule at the center. Why did these two populists follow such different trajectories? We argue that three factors separate the experience of Indira Gandhi from that of Narendra Modi: 1) the form of populist politics in relation to the party system, 2) the character, cohesion and strength of the political opposition and 3) the strategies of state institutions, from the judiciary to the security services. This comparison of processes and outcomes, arising out of our broader work on populist politics, can shed light on the universe of success and failure of populist authoritarianism, from Tayyip Erdogan and Victor Orban on one side to Donald Trump and Imran Khan on the other.

Authors

• Adnan Naseemullah, King's College London

• Pradeep Chhibber, University of California, Berkeley