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Theories on rebel alliances address a host of environmental and structural factors that determine whether rebel groups fight or cooperate. Research often focuses on similar group features, such as shared goals, identities, and enemies. The existing work can predict groups’ alliance choices. Yet, it does not explain why rebel groups collaborate as they do at that moment. Not all groups with similar goals or identities form a united rebel front. Insurgents must develop mutual trust to pool their resources and operate under a shared banner due to the problem of reciprocation. Similar group characteristics do not necessarily facilitate inter-group trust and integrated rebel alliances. In this paper, first, I propose a typology of rebel alliances, mainly focusing on social trust and pathways to cooperation. I examine the factors preceding coordination and how these factors lead to a specific form of alliance. Second, I develop a theory of rebel group cooperation with a particular focus on relational, ideological, and environmental elements. While relational dynamics indicate inter-group ties and rebel-sponsor interactions, ideological aspects illustrate whether groups seek similar governmental and territorial goals. Last, environmental conditions imply under what circumstances rebel groups are more likely to merge.