Reconstruction from the Margins: A Relational Model of Liberalism

• In Event: New Theoretical Perspectives for Democratic Innovations

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that a relational model of liberalism is necessary to fully understand the complexities of liberal practices in so-called “non-Western” societies. A relational model of liberalism is a liberal model grounded in relational autonomy. This is a liberal model because it incorporates the ideal of equal respect as the defining characteristic of the theoretical model. At the same time, it modifies the liberal universalist model grounded in the classic conceptions of individual autonomy toward a situated direction. The global expansion of the liberal model is often understood as simply applying the mainstream liberal model to “non-Western” societies. However, I argue that this creates the following problem: the discrepancies between the liberal practices in these societies and the “Western” liberal democracies are often treated as particularities that should be reduced or overcome for these societies to be considered liberal democracies in the fullest sense. This both explicitly and implicitly reinforces the idea that liberal values such as individual autonomy are a fundamentally “Western” ideal and that liberal practices in other societies should approximate the standard “Western” model. This idea restricts “non-western” individuals from having authorship over the liberal ideal even when they endorse it and perpetuates their marginalized position within the liberal discourse. In contrast, the relational model of liberal democracy interprets the discrepancies as a sign that the members of “non-Western” societies have exercised relational autonomy, i.e., an agent’s capacity to appropriate the existing norms and life projects and provide legitimate reasons why they are suitable for one’s situated and relational contexts.
This paper consists of two parts. First, I explain what exactly a relational model of liberalism is and why it is a better theoretical framework for interpreting liberal practices in “non-Western” societies than the existing liberal universalist model. Second, I discuss the abolishment of the Hoju system, one of the major accomplishments of the women’s rights movement in South Korea, to illustrate my theoretical argument. The Hoju system, a system of family law that permits only men as legal heads of the family, was abolished in 2006 after a 60-year-long activism. The Hoju system was believed to reflect Confucian values and traditions, and the activists who aimed to abolish the Hoju system were often seen as ardent supporters of “Western” values. While the abolishment of the Hoju system was aimed at protecting women’s individual autonomy and, in that sense, can be construed as liberal practices, the movement was more than a simple mimicry of “Western” liberal democracy. In fact, I argue that these liberal practices in “non-Western” societies can be used to reconstruct the existing liberal model of justice by exposing the necessity to push the liberal model toward a more situated and relational direction. In the second part of the paper, I will show why these “non-Western” liberal practices should be interpreted as a catalyst that demands the transformation of the classic liberal universalism rather than a replica of “Western” liberal movements.

Author

• Yujin Choi, Columbia University