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Abstract: How are promotions and appointments decided in bureaucracies? Are women systematically disadvantaged in some ministries more than others? Research on comparative bureaucracy suggests that ministries vary in terms of whether they patronage or transparent rules for promotion. Based on this insight, we argue that women are likely to face greater obstacles in promotion in ministries that prioritize patronage. This is because clientelism and patronage norms can heighten pressure for homosocial norms of interaction and require more networking outside of working hours. This may disadvantage women in two ways. First, if men are more likely to be prominent in business and high-ranking positions, the homosocial norm will punish women as the well-connected are more likely to be men. Second, if women have greater household expectations, the need to socialize outside of business hours could punish them. Using a series of preregistered tests from a survey of more than 1,000 civil servants from South Korea’s central government agencies between January and April 2023, we assess whether certain ministries place more demands socialization and networks in determining promotion. Our theory, if confirmed in the findings, has important implications for how gender and promotions are structured in democratic bureaucracies. Additionally, it provides novel evidence of interest to the growing literature on the gendered impacts of clientelism and patronage.