Caretaker Governments, Public Policy, and Public Administration

• In Event: Governments, Electoral Systems and Voter Perceptions

Abstract

Whose interests are represented when the electoral link between the government and the people is severed? We show that caretaker governments do not simply guard the status quo, and we redefine their roles in shaping political competition. Caretaker governments are authorized when a government fails or when a new election is called. They last for days, weeks, or even months. Scholars frequently define caretaker governments in terms of what they (supposedly) do not do—change the status quo or legislate. However, there is little systematic evidence to support this claim. We challenge this definition by connecting the duration, composition and constitutional constraints on caretaker governments with data on their policy outputs and public sector appointments in eight European parliamentary democracies. We show evidence that during the periods between elected governments, both legislative and executive “housekeeping” activities do take place. Preliminary evidence suggests that during shorter caretaker periods these activities serve the interests of outgoing government parties, while in longer periods, they support those of incoming government parties.

In this paper, we examine whose interests are represented when the electoral link between the government and the people is severed. We show that caretaker governments do not simply guard the status quo and we redefine their roles in shaping political competition. Caretaker governments take over if the government fails or when a new election is called. They last for days or weeks, and sometimes, when coalition negotiations fail, for months. In the current literature, caretaker governments are defined by what they (supposedly) do not do -- change the status quo or legislate (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). However, there is little systematic evidence to support this claim. We challenge this definition by connecting the duration, composition and constitutional constraints on these governments with data on their policy outputs and public sector appointments in eight European countries. We show that during interim periods both legislative, and executive “housekeeping” activities are taking place. We find that during shorter time periods these serve the interests of the outgoing government parti(es) while in longer ones that of the (incoming) legislative median.

Authors

• Anthony Michael Bertelli, Pennsylvania State University

• Zsuzsanna Blanka Magyar, Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals