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Strong partisanship is traditionally conceptualized as a feature of modern, consolidated democracies with stable and competitive party systems. By contrast, patrimonialism is typically seen as a pre-modern basis for political loyalty that persists mainly in less democratic enclaves of the developing world. In this paper we argue that patrimonialism can function similarly to modern partisanship in terms of structuring robust competition between opposing political factions and influencing voting behavior. We develop this argument via a study of municipal elections in northeastern Brazil, a region commonly seen as a redoubt of clientelism, weak partisanship, and domination by traditional elites. Leveraging original kinship data on Brazilian politicians as well as insights from focus groups and qualitative research, we show that many municipalities are characterized by robust competition between two or more family-based or other non-party political groups. Then, drawing on a survey vignette experiment conducted in ninety municipalities across seven states, we show that a candidate’s affiliation with a local non-party group has a similar effect on vote intention as does party affiliation. Patrimonialism as substitute partisanship helps explain why practices such as political corruption persist in the region, despite voters’ normative opposition.