Who Shall I Say Is Calling? Signal Sender Uncertainty in International Diplomacy

• In Event: The Impact of Decision-Maker Attributes on International Security

Abstract

Problems of signaling are ubiquitous and well documented in international politics, but most of the literature focuses on the “cheap talk” nature of signals or psychological biases that contribute to misperception of signals. Less well recognized is the class of signal sender uncertainty problems, in which the sender of a signal itself cannot be easily authenticated or perceived. These cases often involve diplomatic intermediaries or emissaries, where trust may be absent. In this paper, we propose a simple typology that identifies two key factors driving the level of signal sender uncertainty in diplomatic communications: trust in intermediaries and the consistency of the signal. We offer several examples of signal sender uncertainty drawn from past diplomacy, showing that signal sender uncertainty will be most evident when both psychological trust in the intermediary and consistency of the signal are low; in these cases, even legitimate signals are unlikely to be perceived as intended by the sender. This finding has important implications for policymakers, and we discuss a number of potential mechanisms for reducing uncertainty and facilitating effective diplomatic communications.

Authors

• Marcus Holmes, The College of William & Mary

• Jeff Kaplow, College of William & Mary