How Threats and Promises Affect Public Support for International Cooperation

• In Event: Public Opinion and Individual Preferences on International Collaboration

Abstract

Although states usually agree to cooperate internationally when the benefits of such cooperation exceed the costs, these costs can still be substantial. How can governments intent on signing such agreements convince the public that these costs are worth bearing? To examine this question, we examine how framing the consequences of cooperation and the consequences of not cooperating affects public attitudes. In light of well-known biases in people’s decision-making, we argue that framing cooperation as a potential gain, or its absence as a potential loss influences voters’ willingness to embrace international cooperation. We analyze three pre-registered survey experiments, fielded in five countries, concerning different international negotiations. Contrary to expectations about people’s loss aversion, our results show that framing the lack of cooperation as a loss substantially reduces support among opponents of the agreement, whereas highlighting potential gains increases overall support. These findings have broader implications for our understanding of the (lack of) persuasiveness of elite endorsements, especially with regard to the backlash to “project fear” campaigns, and carry important practical advice for advocates of international cooperation.

Authors

• Giorgio Malet, University of Zurich

• Stefanie Walter, University of Zurich