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In an international dispute involving an asymmetric alliance and a common adversary, why do certain political elites within the protégé condemn the patron while others condemn the adversary? This study argues that different conceptions of autonomy amongst political elites lead to a variation in who is condemned in an international dispute. Specifically, conservative political elites are more likely to prioritize autonomy from the adversary, while liberal political elites are more likely to prioritize autonomy from the patron. I test my theory on a key U.S. protégé in this study by conducting a content analysis of the political elites in South Korea. The empirical findings support the theory that conservative political elites in South Korea are more likely to prioritize autonomy from the adversary, while the converse holds for progressive political elites. This study contributes to understanding how political elites within a protégé conceptualize the security-autonomy tradeoff.