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Democracy requires that the public hold leaders accountable for poor behavior in office. In this paper, I examine whether the public holds governors accountable for scandals that occur on their watch. Using a unique time-series dataset of governor approval from 46 states between 1977 and 2019, I show that scandals decrease governor popularity and that this effect lingers for several quarters unless the governor resigns. The public does not respond equally to all scandals. The public does not respond to scandals that involve the executive office but do not involve the governor or their family directly. The effect of scandals is longer for those that involve the abuse of power whereas personal scandals tend to have a larger but shorter effect. Then unlike in cross-national studies, governors who are overseeing a strong economy or who have strong partisan backing are not insulated from the effect of scandals. Taken together, these results suggest that the public is monitoring elite behavior, can distinguish levels of responsibility, and prioritizes good governance.