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Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s Law and Justice parties are often listed in the same breath due to their shared Euroskepticism and affinity for illiberal policies that erode democratic norms. While the war in Ukraine revealed a deep fissure in these two populist governments’ responses to Russian aggression, another aspect that differentiates these regimes is income redistribution policy. Fidesz has been associated with the reduction in the level of income redistribution and favoring of the wealthier strata of society whereas Polish populists engaged in redistribution to lower-income groups. This paper explores the puzzle of these divergent social policies. It argues that, economic pressures notwithstanding, these differences reflect a much more competitive electoral environment faced by the Polish populists, combined with a significant difference in the nature of ties between business and government. Facing political adversaries who already discussed protecting national economic interests, Polish populists produced a narrative emphasizing social inequality. Seeing an implosion of political opposition, the Fidesz regime focused on cultivating the support of the Hungarian economic elite rather than the voters. This argument has implications for the longevity of populist rule in both countries. As the Polish “liberal” opposition promises to uphold populists’ signature social programs, it appeals to pocketbook voters for whom democratic erosion might be a secondary consideration. By contrast, an electoral system heavily favoring Fidesz, along with strongly pro-Fidesz mass media and economic elites with ties to the Kremlin, make it more difficult and costly for voters to oust populist forces in Hungary.