Good Czars and Bad Boyars: Power-Sharing and Blame in Authoritarian Regimes

• In Event: Elite Dynamics and Social and Political Control in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

As the most powerful figures in their political systems, autocrats should attract substantial blame when their regimes perform poorly, undermining their popular support. However, autocrats may be able to mitigate this vulnerability through power-sharing arrangements in which responsibility for policy decisions is delegated to other political elites. The article draws on data from Google Trends, the Afro and Asian Barometer Surveys, and cross-national instability data to provide evidence for three implications of this argument. First, citizens of authoritarian regimes recognize relative reductions in the autocrat's decision-making powers; second, they attribute more blame to autocrats perceived to delegate less; and third, these autocrats are more vulnerable to mass opposition during periods of popular discontent. These findings point to blame avoidance as an important motive for autocrats to share power, and they contribute to understanding of why some autocrats are more successful than others at retaining popular support.

Author

• Scott Williamson, Oxford University