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Why do states so often fight over territory, including territories with little economic or strategic value? Prior research emphasizes that territory holds intangible (symbolic) value, especially where people connect the territory to their national homeland. However, it is possible that people do not so much treasure the land itself as desire not to lose it to an adversary. We theorize that potentially losing it to another actor adds critical social competition value to territory. We test our theory using a survey experiment in Japan on attitudes toward the Senkaku Islands dispute. Would Japanese citizens view the loss of these small, uninhabited islands to China as significantly more detrimental for Japan than losing the islands because they submerge after an earthquake? Or are the islands themselves what matters? We present an experimental design and pre-analysis plan to answer this question. Evidence that participants regard losing the islands to China as significantly worse for Japan than losing them to a natural disaster would provide a novel insight into why states value disputed territory, while a null result would support existing arguments that actors prize territory for its intangible value.