Legislative Representation in Inchoate Party Systems: Parties versus Politicians

• In Event: The Effect of Citizens and Local Politics on Legislatures

Abstract

How do voters structure their legislative vote choice in inchoate party systems? In institutionalized party systems, where parties have established and consistent reputations, aggregate vote choice is roughly predictable over time and across subnational units. However, in places with high electoral volatility, low party institutionalization, and weak partisan attachments, scholars have fewer explanations for predicting vote choice. We propose that in these places, voters may feel a stronger attachment to individual candidates than parties, a theory which requires a focus on the microfoundations of vote choice and a reorientation towards the party-affiliation and party-switching behavior of legislative candidates. As a result, we argue that voters’ electoral choices are based on a combination of three elements: 1) partisan affiliation, in those cases where parties endure in time, 2) personal affiliation, in which voters follow politicians they favor regardless of the politicians’ party identification, and 3) clientelism. Notably, we suggest that in inchoate party systems, all three of these elements are driven more by personal linkages rather than party linkages.

After developing the theory, we identify a set of observable implications for two classes of citizens: the electorate and candidates for office. First, we seek leverage to understand electorates using aggregate (subnational) election results from Ecuador, a place with a notably volatile party system. We build models of party competition that rigorously test and disentangle the forces arising from parties, regions, districts, cantons, and individual elections to provide a more comprehensive account of electoral outcomes and the nature of the party system. Second, we trace the patterns of party affiliation of candidates from 1979-2021 and its correlation to sub-national vote choice. As a general matter, we will show how the forces operating on the citizenry can be decomposed to their appropriate level of analysis. We suspect the results will provide evidence of high party-level volatility and legislator-level stability, and as well as the joint influence of partisan and personal affiliation on vote choice.

Authors

• Thomas Mustillo, University of Notre Dame

• John Polga-Hecimovich, U.S. Naval Academy