A Call to Arms: Political Violence and the Boundaries of American Identity

• In Event: The Politics of National Identity

Abstract

Recent scholarship has revealed concerning levels of support for partisan violence in the American public, and the potential for mass political violence in the United States (Kalmoe & Mason 2022). Yet, America has a long history of employing violence for political gain against its enemies, both foreign and domestic. The imagery of heroic patriots fighting against un-American adversaries is a bedrock of the American zeitgeist rooted in the Revolutionary War, and routinely invoked throughout American history, including as recently as the January 6 Capitol attack. In this way, the psychological boundaries of national identity – individuals’ views regarding who does and does not count as an American – are a key ingredient in understanding why and how ordinary citizens are willing to support partisan political violence.

I argue that when members of the mass public view groups of citizens as outside the boundaries of American national identity, by thinking about members of these groups less as American and more as un-American, these beliefs will predict support for partisan political violence. Put differently, if there are un-American citizens in our midst, then political parties are compelled to act in more extreme, violent ways to protect the country against them. All else equal, individuals should support partisan violence in pursuit of defending the American in-group from the un-American outsiders, even if those outsiders are fellow citizens.

I examine the link between un-American group perceptions and support for political violence in two ways: 1) specific support for out-party targeted violence among partisans, and 2) general support for political violence among individuals who hold a more exclusionary American identity. In the first case, I hypothesize that if one views members of their out-party as un-American, they are more likely to support violence conducted by their own party against the out-party. In the latter case, I hypothesize that if one perceives a group (or groups) of citizens as un-American, regardless of who comprises the group, they are more likely to support violence promulgated by either political party. In other words, those who consider multiple social groups un-American (regardless of which political party those groups affiliate with) are more likely to support political violence by either party.

Across two national quota-based web surveys conducted in 2019 and 2022, respondents rated a variety of social groups (e.g. Whites, African Americans, Christians, Muslims, Atheists, Feminists, LGBT Community, Liberals, Conservatives, Republicans, Democrats, BLM, and Trump supporters) as American or un-American, then provided views on partisan political violence using items from Kalmoe & Mason (2022). In both studies, I find consistent evidence that moving from labeling groups as American to classifying them as un-American exerts more predictive power over support for partisan violence than feelings towards these groups, moral disengagement towards the parties, and one’s own sense of American identity and patriotism. Further, beliefs that groups are un-American more frequently explain support for political violence by either party, indicating that a general disposition towards exclusionary boundaries of American identity better explain support for political violence than specific out-partisan animosities. There nonetheless exists a durable link between believing fellow citizens are un-American and supporting partisan-driven violence against them. While views that fellow citizens are un-American believes may be not be a common occurrence, they present a call to arms that parties can exploit for political gain.

Author

• Julie Wronski, University of Mississippi