Demand and Supply of Criminal Governance: List Experiments in Four Countries

• In Event: Militias, Militaries, and Criminal Gangs

Abstract

This paper analyzes the demand and supply of criminal governance in Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico during the COVID pandemic. The literature on armed actor governance usually portrays rebels or criminals as imposing top-down decisions of governance on the population. However, these explanations largely neglect the agency that civilians have in demanding the delivery of governance services from armed actors. We develop a theoretical framework to integrate the supply and demand of criminal governance. On the demand side, individuals experiencing harsh economic difficulties associated with the pandemic are more likely to ask criminal groups for help. On the supply side, criminal organizations are generally unresponsive to the requests of those affected by economic difficulties and tend to target them with harsh lockdowns. In contrast, when criminals provide aid, it is to primarily buy the “hearts and minds” of potential pockets of popular resistance from middle-class organized individuals. The empirical strategy uses a set of list experiments conducted in four countries ravaged by organized crime. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, results show that economic vulnerability and potential popular resistance are the main drivers of the demand and supply of criminal governance, respectively.

Authors

• Javier Osorio, University of Arizona

• Susan Brewer-Osorio, University of Arizona