Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Conference
Location
About APSA
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
The study of rebel governance has proliferated in recent years. However, less attention has been paid to rebel governance in areas where other sources of local authority in addition to the state and the rebels – for example, tribes – are prominent. And even less studied is the long-term impact of rebel governance in such areas on post-conflict political stability. I argue that in countries with already significant sources of parallel authority to the state, rebels must either co-opt or dismantle local authority structures. Where rebel groups are able to co-opt strong local authority structures – based on rebel strength, appealing ideology, and existing local authority resentments against the state – post-conflict arrangements reflect wartime coalitions, and lead to a relatively stable patrimonial state with the local authority structures who supported the rebels as its most important clients. Where rebels are able to dismantle local authority structures – either because they are weak, or through prolonged conflict and resulting weakening of local structures – post-conflict arrangements lead to more egalitarian distributive institutions. Contrary to what this may imply, this is not a net positive development, as post-conflict states are often weak and the destruction of local authorities leads to generalized poverty and state weakness, as supposed to a more stable but patrimonial state. I test this argument by comparing the relationship between rebels and tribes in wartime and post-conflict in Yemen (republican rebels in 1960s, the Houthis in 2013), Afghanistan (Taliban in 1980s, and 2010 to the present), and Southern Somalia (al-Shabaab in 2008-2012).