Coercion versus Imposition in International Politics

• In Event: Strategies of Coercion in the Gray Zone

Abstract

“There is a difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you” (Schelling 1966). This study explores whether states more often make gains by coercion or imposition. It explains why this is a fundamental question for scholars of international politics. It expands on Schelling’s classic distinction between brute force and coercion to create a new typology. It postulates that imposition strategies are generally more effective at making gains than coercion strategies, primarily because coercion strategies suffer from a compliance-dependence disadvantage (Sullivan 2012). It theorizes why this is so. It then uses data to examine how frequently states have revised the status quo in their favor by coercion and imposition across a wide variety of issue areas. It begins with territory and regime change – the two issues over which states most often fight wars – before proceeding to evaluate other issue areas more briefly.

Author

• Dan Altman, Georgia State University