Balancing, Bandwagoning, Bargaining and War

• In Event: Bargaining and Disputes

Abstract

Realist security theory emphasizes distinctions between balancing power (joining the weaker side against the stronger) and bandwagoning (joining the stronger side against the weaker). As conventionally defined, however, balancing and bandwagoning pose several conceptual and empirical problems. We develop modified definitions of balancing and bandwagoning and then use the new definitions to assess the empirically tractable question of third-party joining in disputes. States considering intervention must weigh expectations and interests. Third-party joiners can intervene to affect the probability of victory for the side they prefer to win (balancing) or they can intervene to influence the demands of the side they expect to win (bandwagoning). Bargaining theory suggests that contests most often result from uncertainty about strategic variables rather than from the values of variables themselves. While joiners' decisions shift the local balance of power, the consequences of intervention for dispute duration depend on whether joiners balance or bandwagon. Intervention also informs participants about strategic conditions.

Authors

• Erik Gartzke, UCSD

• Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, University of Essex