A Formal Model of Bureaucratic Sabotage

• In Event: Poster Session: Political Methodology & American Political Economy
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: American Political Economy

Abstract

Why do efforts to reform city agencies, including municipal police departments, repeatedly come to a standstill - despite widespread public support and determination by city officials? While anecdotal evidence suggests that reform endeavors often falter due to a unique kind of resistance from local government employees, the underlying dynamics and determinants of bureaucratic resistance remain underexplored. In this project, we provide a formal model of bureaucratic resistance to show when and how electoral incentives vest bureaucrats with political power, trigger sabotage of public services, and affect politicians' reform policies. The model involves an incumbent, a challenger, a bureaucrat, and a voter. An incumbent politician seeks re-election by deciding between a reform policy of uncertain value and the status quo and is confronted by an anti-reform bureaucrat who decides on a level of effort for public goods provision. Since the voter’s observation of the reform’s value is imperfect and can be affected by the bureaucrat’s effort, bureaucrats can engage in costly shirking to sabotage public payoffs and damage the reputation of the incumbent and the reform. Our results shed new light on the implications of policy-motivated, strategic behavior of bureaucrats for electoral accountability and policy-making.

Authors

• Elisa Maria Wirsching, Princeton University

• Byeonggeun Kun Heo, New York University