Who Punishes? Cooperation and Defection across Cultures

• In Event: Theory and Experimental Evidence of Cooperation and Coordination

Abstract

Antisocial punishment is typically defined as punishment of cooperators. It undermines cooperation according to computational models. In experimental work, a significant minority of people engage in antisocial punishment – especially in cultures with weak norms of civic duty and weak rule of law. How does cooperation persist despite the prevalence of antisocial punishment? I identify that computational and experimental work use conflicting definitions of antisocial punishment. I then apply the computational definition to experimental data, reanalyzing existing data from public goods games conducted in 16 different countries (Herrmann et al. 2008). I find that the previously used experimental definition overstates the prevalence and cross-cultural variation of antisocial punishment. Using the computational definition, antisocial punishment is exceedingly rare, allowing cooperation to flourish.

Author

• Talbot M Andrews, Cornell University