Ethnic Politics & Alliance Formation

• In Event: Alliance Politics

Abstract

What role does ethnic politics play in international military cooperation? Ethnically-motivated domestic pressure can incentivize leaders to support co-ethnics in other states via alliance formation. Alliances can include provisions which commit signatories to defend against external threats (e.g. defense pacts), or against internal threats (such as consultation or non-interference agreements). Alliances can therefore deter both external and internal challenges to a government's power. Because people value the well-being of co-ethnics, governments may face domestic pressure to support co-ethnics facing threat in other states. However, we only expect ethnically-motivated domestic pressure to motivate alliance formation under certain conditions: (1) co-ethnics must control both governments, (2) one government must face either internal or external threat, and (3) ethnicity must be politically salient to the government not facing internal or external threat. We evaluate our argument using a dataset composed of directed-dyads and multiple measures of (a) co-ethnicity, (b) external threat to a government, and (c) internal threat. Our findings illustrate the role of race and ethnic politics in broad patterns of military cooperation in the international system, show how the international politics of ethnicity shape which governments are more likely to remain in power, and suggests the domestic ethnic politics of the most powerful states in the international system affects which groups are in power in other countries. Further, our findings show how domestic political order and international political order are co-constituted and ethnicity must be considered by scholars of both spheres.

Authors

• Joshua Landry, Oklahoma State University

• Roman Hlatky, University of North Texas