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Why do U.S. presidents consider alternatives to war when armed conflict is the path ultimately chosen? Using a structured focused comparison, I analyze the decision making process the George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush presidential administrations chose to pursue the Persian Gulf War in 1990 and the Iraq War in 2003, respectively. I argue two factors explain the failure to pursue alternative courses of action: (1) cherry-picking of evidence combined with (2) the role of misinformation in pushing two presidents to choose a path of war.
In January 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva, Switzerland as part of a last ditch effort to avert the conflict. However, this was but one leg of a longer tour in order to build coalition partners for the invasion of Iraq. Previously, the Nayirah testimony, falsely provided before Congress in October 1990, convinced Congress and the president of the need to counter Saddam Hussein and his takeover of Kuwait. Twelve years later, President George W. Bush pursued a preventive war in Iraq to stop Hussein from obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). By cherry picking evidence, such as the claim that Iraq sought yellow cake uranium in Niger, neoconservatives within the Bush administration convinced the American public to support a war of choice. While UN weapons inspectors requested more time to verify Hussein did not possess such weapons, Bush 43 promised a United Nations Security Council vote to authorize the use of force. However, facing the threat of a veto from France, the White House relied on previous authorizations from the UNSC in addition to an authorization vote in Congress to conduct the war. These last attempts to prevent war therefore represent key examples of American presidents utilizing misinformation to justify war.
Additionally, this research brings to the forefront of analysis the contextual factors, such as the consequences of decisions of past presidents (sometimes referred to as “legacy chains”), which then limit the range of potential options to future executives. By pushing back Iraqi forces in the early 1990s without removing Hussein from power, Bush 41 set up the conditions for Bush 43 to complete the ouster of Iraq’s dictator over a decade later. This research utilizes archival materials from the Bush 41 and Bush 43 presidential libraries, as well as Secretary Baker’s papers at Princeton’s Mudd Library. It is significant given contemporary debates in the United States on how to identify potential “off ramps,” or alternatives to hostilities, for Russian President Vladimir Putin to prevent escalation as his war of aggression against Ukraine. Given fears about the use of nuclear weapons during the conflict, the question of the seriousness of alternate courses of action considered by decision makers is crucial.