Effects of Independent Boundary Commissions in Canada and the United States

• In Event: Political Party Strategies and Ideologies / Electoral Boundaries

Abstract

Can non-partisan institutions de-politicize election practices? The drawing of electoral districts is far more controversial in the United States than in Canada. Canada, which has used independent commissions since the adoption of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act of 1964, largely insulates the process from partisan influence. In contrast, the United States has no similar federal legislation; the act of redistricting is typically a highly partisan process conducted by state governments. Exceptionally, however, Arizona and California recently implemented independent commissions and four other states have forms of commissions for congressional redistricting to limit partisan influence. In addition, judicial decisions based in Constitutional doctrine starting with Baker v. Carr (1962), and Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) have removed certain criteria (e.g., population equality) from partisan influence in all states. We use data from post-war federal elections in both countries and a series of indicators developed in the American context (i.e, the swing ratio, efficiency gap, and comparing the mean and median vote) to assess the effects of independent commissions on partisan bias and population inequality among districts. We expect the use of commissions to reduce the former, but that judicial limits will have a more dramatic effect on the latter.

Authors

• Peter Miller, Brennan Center for Justice

• Benjamin Forest, McGill University