Institutional Engagement and Informal Change at the UN General Assembly

• In Event: Institutional Change in a Shifting Global Context

Abstract

Institutional change is often studied by examining how formal and informal rules shift across time. Yet even when institutional bounds appear stagnant, internal movement in how states engage with an institution can reveal much larger changes in cooperation dynamics. We illustrate this argument through an examination of how countries subject to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly's voting ban have shifted their institutional approach across time. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, countries in arrears for at least two years are excluded from voting unless they pay their dues or are granted an exemption. At the turn of the 21st century, nearly 1/3 of the UN's membership was subject to this process, with relatively few states requesting exemptions. Since 2000, however, institutional engagement has shifted and today, almost no countries lose the right to vote. Drawing on original data on Article 19 eligibility from 1945-2021, we show that engagement has shifted significantly across time, due not only to changes in budgetary procedures and informal rules, but also because of shifts in how UN members understand the reputational costs and benefits of being excluded from voting. Our results suggest that institutional engagement sheds light on the normative and strategic environment of institutionalized cooperation.

Authors

• Julia C. Morse, University of California, Santa Barbara

• Annjulie Vester, UC Santa Barbara

• Bridget Coggins, University of California, Santa Barbara