Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Conference
Location
About APSA
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
This research consists of a case study about public corruption in Spain that analyses the anatomy of corruption following both results from perception surveys and a new objective indicator based on judicial resolutions.
The literature differentiates between three general ways of measuring corruption. First, and probably the most used measurements, are perception indicators which are based on the opinions and perceptions of citizens or experts about corruption. Nonetheless, some authors consider that this tool can be remarkably influenced by the impact of the media treatment of corruption cases. Second, there are experience-based indicators, which are less usual and focus on measures of citizens’ or firms’ actual experiences with corruption, for instance, if they have paid or received bribes. This methodology has the limitation that most people are unwilling to declare its implication in corrupt situations. Finally, recent literature has increasingly focused on objective indicators, those which are based on undisputed facts, for example, the existence of anti-corruption laws or the funding received by anti-corruption agencies.
This research aims, on the one hand, to define some of the basic characteristics of public corruption in Spain, concerning the administrations where it mostly takes place, the public activities in relation to which it appears, and the profile of the perpetrators. On the other hand, the study tries to give some evidence on the differences between the observed corruption depending on the method used to measure it, assessing to what extent data from public perceptions surveys fit with the results of objective measures based on final judgements. The research tries to shine new light on the debate on the measurement of corruption taking the Spanish case to illustrate the relevant differences that can appear between objective and survey methodologies.
The research is based on the construction and exploitation of a dataset of judgements for corruption felonies committed by politicians or public officers in Spain between 1995 and 2015 (N=576). I have created the dataset through an analysis of the judgements available at the CENDOJ, the documentation center of the Spanish Judicial Power.
The analysis of judicial decisions done before in research about corruption in the Spanish case has not included a systematic analysis of a large-N sample of judgements issued in the country, on the contrary, the majority of authors have used media information about corruption cases. Most of the literature using judicial resolutions to measure corruption is related to the US and based on the reports to the Congress of the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice. However, this data does not permit us to have in-depth knowledge of the corruption cases. Thus, the conclusions of the analysis of this dataset will be one of the first pieces of large-N empirical evidence about the anatomy of corruption using an objective measure based on judicial decisions.
The results show that in the line of public perceptions, corruption in Spain is basically political, not administrative. Nonetheless, some specific areas of the administration show remarkable levels of petty corruption (for instance, some state public companies). Public perceptions do not show differences in the level of perceived corruption between national, regional, and local institutions. However, objective measures show that corruption in Spain is mostly local. Contrary to what is publicly perceived, security forces and police are one of the most corrupt sectors in Spain. Finally, in line with public perceptions, corruption in Spain is usually linked to the construction sector and, especially, to the building boom before the 2008 economic crisis.
These results can have relevant implications for public integrity policy and permit us to assess how public perceptions alone are not a good proxy for corruption levels in a country due to the relevant impact of media scandals about political corruption.