Persistent Unilateral Action

• In Event: The Presidency and Unilateral Action

Abstract

Many believe that weaker legal constraints make unilateral easier to reverse than legislation. But in some cases, unilateralism survives a successor's determined opposition, which this story fails to explain. I argue instead that legislative persistence and unilateral transience may additionally arise from a selection effect: unilateralism and subsequent rescission can both stem from weak underlying policy-demanding groups. But if unilateralism itself alters the landscape of group power through policy feedback effects, it can survive a purportedly opposed new president. An example is the Trump Administration's failure to roll back the Obama Justice Department's lax stance on cannabis. Weak constituents' policy demands may thus need to rely on a sympathetic president's unilateral action to begin a feedback loop, subsequently softening opposition. This paper therefore identifies unilateral action as a key tool for shifting policy in an enduring way, explaining its success or failure in terms of the power of groups.

Author

• David Robert Foster, Florida State University